Cultural Diversity, Discrimination and Economic Outcomes: An Experimental Analysis by Paul J. Ferraro & Ronald G. Cummings
 
 
 
Cultural Diversity, Discrimination and Economic Outcomes: 
 an experimental analysis 
 
 
Paul J. Ferraro 
and 
Ronald G. Cummings  
 
 
Department of Economics 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
P.O. Box 3992 
Georgia State University 
Atlanta, GA  30302-3992 
 
 
pferraro@gsu.edu 
404-651-1372 (voice) 
404-651-0425 (fax) 
Working Paper 2003-002, revised January 2005   i
Cultural Diversity, Discrimination and Economic Outcomes: 
 an experimental analysis 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Economists have paid increasing attention to the role of cultural diversity in explaining the 
variability of economic outcomes across societies. We develop an experimental framework that 
complements existing research in this area.  We implement the framework with two cultures that co-
exist in an industrialized society:  the Hispanic and Navajo cultures in the southwestern United 
States. We vary the ethnic mix of our experimental sessions in order to infer the effect of inter-
cultural interactions on economic behavior and outcomes. We control for demographic differences in 
our subject pools and elicit beliefs directly in order to differentiate between statistical discrimination 
and preference-based discrimination. We present clear evidence that Hispanic and Navajo subjects 
behave differently and that their behavior is affected by the ethnic composition of the experimental 
session. Our experimental framework has the potential to shed much needed light on economic 
behavior and outcomes in societies of mixed ethnicity, race and religion. 
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Cultural Diversity, Discrimination and Economic Outcomes:  an experimental analysis 
 
I. Introduction 
Economic disparities have long existed across nations and between racial and ethnic groups 
within nations. Not surprisingly, economists are beginning to take a closer look at the role of 
“culture” in explaining global variability in economic behavior and outcomes.  One path of inquiry 
focuses on cross-cultural differences in behavior (e.g., Brandts et al., 2004; Henrich, 2000; Croson 
and Buchan, 1999; Burlando and Hey, 1997; Roth et al. 1991).  In particular, an initiative to explore 
the effect of culture in 15 small-scale societies across the globe has found striking variability in the 
outcomes of economic experiments (Henrich et al., 2001, 2003). 
Others have taken the “cultural effects” inquiry in a different direction:  if cultural 
differences affect economic behavior and outcomes (or indeed even if they do not), do inter-cultural 
relationships affect behavior and outcomes?  A controversial empirical literature has developed over 
the role that cultural diversity may play in explaining cross-national or cross-regional differences in 
economic outcomes.  Some authors (e.g., Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 2003) find that 
there is an inverse relationship between economic growth and cultural diversity, while others (e.g., 
Collier 2001; Fearon 2003) contest this conclusion. In the United States, Alesina et al. (1997) find 
that cultural diversity is an important determinant of local public finances.  In particular, they find an 
inverse relationship between diversity and spending on education, roads and sewers, which they 
attribute to majority white citizens reacting to the size of minority groups.  Miguel (1999) finds 
similar results in Kenyan primary schools: high levels of ethnic diversity are linked to lower school 
funding, lower student to teacher ratio, and lower parental involvement in school functions. 
One possible mechanism through which cultural diversity can affect economic behavior and  
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outcomes is discrimination (Barr and Oduro 2002).  Economists have performed many empirical 
analyses to identify discrimination in the marketplace and to determine the nature of the 
discrimination (for recent reviews, see Yinger 1998; Altonji and Blank 1999; Riach and Rich 2002). 
To test for discrimination, economists depend on regression-based methods and field experiments. 
The former technique tests for a statistical relationship between an outcome measure, such as wage 
or price, and a group membership indicator (e.g., Goldberg 1996).  The latter includes audit studies 
(e.g., Neumark et al. 1996) and correspondence tests (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004).  As 
noted by List (2004), empirical studies have provided evidence that discrimination exists in various 
markets, but they rarely allow the analyst to draw conclusions concerning the nature of 
discrimination (i.e., is it preference-based or statistical?). 
Our paper provides an experimental framework that can tie together these disparate 
literatures and help economists move toward a synthesis of the effects that “culture” has on 
economic behavior and outcomes.  In particular, our analysis complements existing research in three 
important ways. 
First, empirical analyses of the economic effects of cultural diversity at the level of 
communities and nations suffer from the inability to control many of the factors that affect the 
observed outcomes and the classic problem of having only one observation of the world at time t.  
By virtue of the experimenter’s ability to control and manipulate the cultural diversity within 
laboratory sessions, our experimental framework provides a path of inquiry that can yield insights 
into the recent debate about the role of cultural diversity and economic outcomes in societies. In the 
laboratory, one can reproduce existing cultural diversity patterns or create counterfactual societies. 
Observations of these laboratory societies offer insights about behavior and outcomes in the  
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naturally-occurring societies outside the laboratory.  We know of no other experiment designed to 
determine if the cultural diversity of the experimental session affects how subjects make decisions. 
Second, as mentioned above, economists have been successful in developing techniques to 
identify discrimination, but less successful at explaining observed discrimination.  If rational agents 
have no information about the behavior of the person with whom they are interacting, but have 
information about the average behavior of the group to which the person belongs (e.g., an ethnic 
group), they may condition their decision on this average behavior.  Such discrimination is called 
“statistical discrimination,” or “rational stereotyping” (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972).  If, in contrast, 
rational agents simply prefer to behave differently when interacting with an individual from a given 
group, such behavior is called “preference-based discrimination,” or “a taste for discrimination” 
(Becker, 1971). From a theoretical and policy perspective, the difference between these two types of 
discrimination is important, but the relative importance of each type empirically is controversial 
(Ladd, 1998). 
Like the recent paper by List (2004), we demonstrate how our experimental framework can 
provide insights into the economics of discrimination. The paper complements List by demonstrating 
an alternative method for distinguishing between statistical discrimination and preference-based 
discrimination in situ, without requiring inferences to be drawn from behavior in other experiments. 
Third, cross-cultural experiments often emphasize cross-national differences in behavior. We 
wish to determine if cross-cultural differences in economic decision-making can be detected within 
two cultures that co-exist in the same industrialized society. Furthermore, through the control 
afforded by the laboratory, we ensure that we do not attribute to “culture” any differences in 
behavior that stem from variability in the socio-demographic attributes of our subjects.  
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To address these issues, we organized experimental sessions of a simple bargaining game 
with members of two cultural groups from New Mexico:  Navajo Indians and Hispanic Americans. 
We varied the cultural mix of our experimental sessions in order to infer the effect of inter-cultural 
interactions on economic behavior.  In the next section, we define what we mean by “culture” and 
describe the way in which our study builds on previous experimental research. In Section III, we 
describe the design of our experiments. Results are reported in sections IV and V and, in Section VI, 
we present a simulation based on these results. Concluding remarks are offered in section VII. 
 
II.  Culture, Ethnicity and Race 
Our experiments were conducted in Albuquerque, New Mexico. New Mexico is arguably the 
most unique state in the U.S. in terms of ethnic diversity, with three major ethnic groups each 
accounting for a sizable proportion of the population. In 2001, New Mexico’s population was 42.1% 
Hispanic, 45% Anglo, and 10% Native American, with Blacks and Asians accounting for the 
remaining 2.9%.
1 New Mexico has a higher Hispanic population, in terms of percentage of total 
population, than any other state in the U.S. Other states have a higher proportion of Native 
Americans, but no other state has a mix of Anglos, Hispanics, and Native Americans comparable to 
New Mexico. Native American and Hispanic cultures are distinct and dominant in the state, and in 
the City of Albuquerque. 
Economists who work with concepts like culture, ethnicity and race often avoid defining 
such words. Their definitions, however, are subject to much debate in other disciplines (McElreath 
                                                           
1 Department of Commerce website: Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 2001, Washington, DC, Tables 23 and 24.  
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et al., 2003).
2 We use the word “culture” to refer to the statistical distribution of beliefs, values and 
modes of thinking that shape behavior among a group of people (e.g., notions of fairness). 
“Ethnicity” is related to symbolically marked groups (e.g., marked by language, dialect or clothing). 
Cultural differences may be present in a population when ethnicity is not marked (e.g., southern-
born and northern-born whites in the United States; Nisbett and Cohen, 1996). Similarly, ethnic 
differences may exist when no cultural differences exist (except for the ethnic marking). “Race” is 
like ethnicity, except the “markers” are genetically transmitted (e.g., physical characteristics; Gil-
White, 2001). 
Navajo and Hispanic individuals in our experiments are distinct culturally, ethnically and 
racially. We are testing whether such distinctions make any difference in the bargaining behavior of 
our subjects. In our experiment, we cannot differentiate the separate effects of culture, ethnicity and 
race; empirically, they are identical for our purposes. Thus we will use the term “cultural 
differences” to describe any differences that result from differences in culture, ethnicity or race. As 
in previous papers that find relationships between an individual’s culture, ethnicity or race and his or 
her behavior or economic status, we can never be certain that what we describe as cultural 
determinants are not actually non-cultural determinants (for which we have no data) that are 
correlated with our cultural categories. In this sense, what economists call “culture” in analyses of 
economic behavior is best viewed as a residual category. By controlling for differences in behavior 
that stem from variability in the socio-economic attributes of our subjects, we attribute to “cultural 
differences” any remaining variability in behavior across cultural groups.  
Although experimental economists have explored cross-cultural differences in behaviors (see 
references in Introduction), they have generally ignored the question, “Do individuals interacting 
                                                           
2 The authors thank anthropologist Joseph Henrich (Emory University) for directing us to the relevant literature.  
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with others sharing the same culture behave differently than when interacting with others from a 
different culture?” We find only two published studies that address this question: Fershtman and 
Gneezy (2001; hereafter FG) and List (2004).
3 
In experiments with two major Israeli ethnic groups, the Ashkenazic Jews (European and 
American immigrants and their Israeli-born offspring) and the Eastern Jews (Asian and African 
immigrants and their Israeli-born offspring), FG address the effects of ethnic stereotyping on trust 
and bargaining. In their bargaining game, FG find larger offers of a fixed pie are proposed to Eastern 
players.
4 However, they find no significant difference between the percent of Eastern and 
Ashkenazic players that reject a (low) proposed split of 25% of the pie. 
FG write (p. 370) that the observed discrimination “is probably an outcome of a common 
ethnic stereotype in Israeli society, according to which men of Eastern origin are believed to react 
more harshly if treated unfairly.” Absent information about players’ expectations of partner 
responses, however, FG are unable to determine if the observed discrimination derived from 
preference-based discrimination or erroneous statistical discrimination (“stereotyping”).
5 
List (2004) offers the first experimental attempt to differentiate these two types of 
discrimination by examining the bargaining behaviors of participants in a sportscard field 
experiment. He observed starting and final offers for a specific card and collected information on 
                                                           
3 We note, however, Gil-White’s (2003) interesting study of the Ultimatum Game. Similar to FG, it paired members 
from two cultural groups (two Mongolian tribes). We do not explore this study at length because it used deception. 
4 FG do not make clear whether this discrimination was observed only with Ashkenazic Proposers or both Eastern 
(n=33) and Ashkenazic (n=24) Proposers. 
5 In the Trust Game, FG attempted to discriminate between stereotyping and a taste for discrimination by changing 
the rules of the Trust Game to make it a Dictator Game in which the recipient of the offer plays no strategic role.  FG 
found no differences in amounts sent to Eastern and Ashkenazic subjects in the Dictator Game.  From this 
observation, they concluded that there was no evidence of a “taste for discrimination” in the Trust Game.  However, 
using the Dictator Game to infer the source of discrimination in a Trust Game may be problematic if the framing of 
the games generates different norms or behavioral strategies among subjects.  As noted by Goeree and Holt (2001, p. 
1418), an alternative approach would be to elicit beliefs directly as the game is played.  
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basic attributes of the bargainers (age, experience, gender, education, income, height and weight) 
and the length of the bargaining session. Subjects came from four categories:  white males aged 20-
30, white females aged 20-30, white males aged 60+, and “nonwhite” males aged 20-30. Given that 
race was not asked on the questionnaire, it is unclear as to how the author determined race and what 
race, or races, the term “nonwhite” includes for his sample. 
List found that average initial and final offers from dealers to “minority” buyers (females, 
older males, and nonwhite males) were lower than those received by young white males. After 
controlling for experience, the differences were small for experienced buyers (but minority buyers 
did have to spend more time to obtain a similar outcome) and were only significantly different 
among inexperienced older male and young female buyers.
6  List used complementary experiments 
(Dictator Game, Decentralized Chamberlain Market, and a Vickery second-price auction for a real 
card) to elucidate the underlying reasons for the observed discrimination in the field experiment. 
Behavior in the complementary experiments suggests that the discrimination in the field experiment 
was a result of statistical discrimination by dealers rather than preference-based discrimination. We 
develop an alternative method for distinguishing between statistical discrimination and preference-
based discrimination that does not require inferences to be drawn from other experiments:  we elicit 
beliefs in the experiment itself. 
Note that the ways in which inter-cultural effects are induced in FG and List are different 
from our experimental framework.  FG’s inquiry into the existence of inter-cultural discrimination is 
based on a design wherein players attempt to infer the ethnicity of their partners, who are in a 
different location, from the partners’ surnames. In List, subjects can observe the race, gender or 
                                                           
6 Similar results are presented for the offers made by dealers to minority sellers, but the differences are not 
statistically as meaningful.  
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approximate age of their partner or are told these attributes by the experimenter. While these may be 
important contexts, we wish to explore behavioral variability in response to changes in the 
proportional representation of two ethnic groups in an experimental session. In other words, we 
wish to determine if subjects behave differently in the following three contexts:  (1) all players share 
the subject’s ethnicity, (2) the player’s ethnic group makes up a large majority of the players, and (3) 
the player’s ethnic group is a small minority of the players. 
Finally as mentioned in the Introduction, we wish to reduce the chance that we mistakenly 
attribute to “culture” differences in behavior that stem from variability in the socio-demographic 
attributes of our subjects.  For example, FG analyzed only the behavior of the male Proposers in 
their bargaining game and did not analyze rejections controlling for the gender (or ethnicity) of the 
subject making the offer.  Other studies, however, have found gender effects in same game (Eckel 
and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001; Botelho et al., 2002).  FG also did not control for socio-
economic differences across subjects (e.g., Ashkenazic Jews tend to be wealthier).  List, in contrast, 
controls for gender, length of bargaining session, average frequency of buyer transactions per month, 
years of market experience, income, and education.  Likewise, we control for socio-demographic 
attributes that may affect bargaining behavior. 
 
III.  Experiment Design 
Throughout the world, ethnic, racial and religious conflicts persist in the face of potential 
settlements that plainly serve the interests of all sides. We thus conduct our analysis in the 
simplest of bargaining environments:  the Ultimatum Bargaining Game. Two players, a Proposer 
and a Responder, bargain over $10.  The Proposer offers $x to the Responder, leaving himself  
  9
$10-x.  The Responder can either take the offer, in which case each obtains the proposed split of 
the $10 pie, or reject it and both get nothing.  The Ultimatum Game is too simple to be a good 
model of the complicated processes of most real-world bargaining.  Yet, as noted by Camerer 
(2003: 8), its simplicity offers a useful environment for testing hypotheses about the factors that 
influence how people feel about the allocations of money between themselves and others.  It is 
thus unsurprising that previous cross-cultural studies and the Fershtman-Gneezy study have used 
the Ultimatum Game as a vehicle for understanding the ways in which culture affects economic 
behavior. 
The experimental sessions were held in a large room rented at the Menaul School, centrally 
located in Albuquerque.  A portable experimental laboratory was used that consists of 32 networked 
notebook computers with wireless connection to a laptop computer that acts as a server.  Subject 
computers are situated in folding partitions to ensure private decisions.  The instructions for the 
experiments were conveyed orally and in writing.  A portable projector demonstrated the subject 
interface (see appendix for instructions).  Prior to each session, subjects were placed in a room in 
which some food and refreshments were offered.  We grouped subjects prior to entering the 
experimental room for two reasons: (1) such grouping allowed subjects to observe the ethnic 
makeup of their session (Navajo and Hispanic subjects are visually very different) and (2) it allowed 
us to conduct back-to-back sessions without risking cross-session observation or communication. 
Sixty Hispanic subjects were recruited by distributing flyers in Hispanic neighborhoods.  All 
of our Hispanic subjects were raised in the United States.  Sixty Navajo subjects were recruited 
primarily by distributing flyers at three Navajo organizations:  the Southwest Indian Polytechnic 
Institute (SIPI), the PHS Indian Hospital, and the Albuquerque Indian Center.  “Navajo  
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neighborhoods” do not exist and these organizations serve as the closest equivalent.  Overall, 45% of 
the subject pool was male, 59% reported an annual income of less than $15,000, 47% of the sample 
were full- or part-time students, 15% was married and the mean age was 29 years. 
We scheduled four experimental sessions.  The ethnic composition of each session was as 
follows:
7 
Session 1 (All-Hispanic)    30 Hispanic subjects 
Session 2 (Majority-Hispanic)  21 Hispanics subjects and 6 Navajo subjects 
Session 3 (All-Navajo)    29 Navajo subjects and 1 Hispanic subject
8 
    Session 4 (Majority-Navajo)    23 Navajo subjects and 7 Hispanic subjects. 
Session 1 followed immediately by Session 2 took place on one night, and Session 3 followed 
immediately by Session 4 took place the next night. 
  Standard rules of the Ultimatum Game were explained to subjects and subjects were required 
to complete a practice question to ensure they understood how their earnings would be calculated 
(see Davis and Holt (1993) or Roth (1995) for more information on Ultimatum Games).  Subjects 
played the role of both Responder and Proposer (as was done in the original application of the 
                                                           
7 Only 117 of 120 observations were usable.  Given our concern with offending subjects or the organizations from 
which we recruited them, we chose to allow subjects to complete the experiment even if they were unable to 
successfully complete practice questions or were demonstrably unable to comprehend questions.  As a result, we 
exclude data from three subjects: one Navajo subject from the All-Navajo session who could not respond to the 
practice question (even after repeated explanations by the experimenter), had trouble using the mouse, and rejected 
every possible offer; and one Navajo subject from the All-Navajo session and one Hispanic subject from the 
Majority-Hispanic session, both of whom had obvious difficulty completing the practice question and who then 
clicked reject and accept in alternating fashion for every potential offer that could be sent to them.  For these three 
subjects, the idea of a minimum acceptable offer makes no sense and it is unlikely that these subjects understood the 
main components of the experiment.  We note, however, that including these subjects in the analysis by treating their 
first accepted offers as their Responder reservation prices does not affect our results.  When estimating the 
percentage of Navajo and Hispanic in a session, we include these subjects because they were observable to every 
subject in the room (removing them from the percentage calculation does not affect our results). 
8 Native American ethnicity is a requirement for entry into these organizations.  Thus, presumably all subjects in the 
All-Navajo session were Navajo.  However, one subject selected “Hispanic” on the post-experiment questionnaire.  
We are unsure if the subject was indeed Hispanic, was of mixed heritage and did not see the option for mixed 
ethnicity, or made a mistake filling out the questionnaire, which was completed on a computer.  We treat the subject 
as Hispanic, but note that deleting this subject or re-coding her as “Navajo” does not affect our results. 
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Ultimatum Game by Güth et al. (1982) and in later studies like Andreoni et al. (2003), Carter and 
Irons (1991), and Kahneman et al. (1986)).  Subjects were told that they would make decisions as a 
Responder and as a Proposer.  At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly assigned each 
subject to the role of Responder or Proposer, and randomly paired the subject with another subject in 
the room (not known to him or her) who played the opposite role.  Subjects were cautioned to take 
each role seriously given the equal chance that each person had of being assigned the role of 
Responder or Proposer.  With the exception of the All-Navajo and All-Hispanic sessions, the 
ethnicity of a subject’s partner was uncertain but the ethnic composition of the session was obvious: 
the subject’s ethnic group constituted either a large majority or a small minority of the subjects. 
As an aside, we note that our design differs from FG’s in that subjects from one culture 
interact directly with subjects from the other culture.  The only contact that an Ashkenazic subject in 
FG’s experiment had with an Eastern subject was a visual inspection of the Eastern subject’s name 
on a form. 
The amount of money given to the Proposer, known by all subjects, was $10.00.  Subjects 
first saw a screen (Figure 1) that asked them to make the decisions of a Responder.  They were asked 
to indicate, for each dollar amount between $0 and $10, if they were assigned the role of Responder 
and if that dollar amount were sent to them, whether they would accept it or reject it; i.e., we used 
the strategy method.  Eliciting the behavior of Responders through the strategy method allowed us to 
collect data on all information sets of the game, not just those that were actually reached in the 
course of the game.   Subjects were cautioned that, if assigned the role of Responder, they would be 
bound by the decisions that they recorded on this screen.  
[Figure 1 about here]  
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Subjects were then asked to play the role of a Proposer.  To allow us to make inferences 
about discriminatory behavior that may be observed in the laboratory, subjects were first asked to 
predict how they believed Responders would respond to each possible amount that they might send 
to a Responder, from $0 to $10 (Figure 2 below).  Subjects predicted the percent of Responders in 
the session that would accept each amount.  To create incentives for subjects to think about their 
estimates, subjects were informed that the individual whose estimates were the closest to the actual 
percent of Responders accepting each amount would win $10.00.
9 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Subjects were then asked to decide how much they would send to a Responder if they were 
assigned the role of a Proposer (Figure 3).  Subjects were advised that if assigned the role of 
Proposer, the amount they chose on this screen would be sent to the Responder. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Finally, subjects responded to a questionnaire (Figure 4) that inquired about the motivations 
for the decisions made by the subject as a Responder (Figure 1) and as a Proposer (Figure 3).  At the 
end of the session, demographic information was obtained from each subject.  The same person 
conducted all the sessions. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
                                                           
9 More specifically, they were told that the absolute values of the differences between their predicted percentages 
and the actual percentages for each potential offer would be summed.  The subject with the lowest sum wins the 
$10.00.  We do not claim that this method is incentive-compatible (we gratefully acknowledge related comments 
offered by Uri Gneezy).  However, our payment rule is highly transparent and can include truth telling as one best 
response, while a best response that deviates from true beliefs under this rule requires sophisticated strategizing 
about the beliefs of others in the session and mathematical acumen to solve for a best-response conditional on those 
beliefs.  Moreover, a recent study by two economists who have published numerous experiments using incentive-
compatible quadratic scoring rules (Sonnemans and Offerman, 2001) found no significant difference between the 
beliefs elicited from a sophisticated quadratic scoring rule that corrects for undesired effects of risk attitudes and 
probability weighting and beliefs elicited from a method that simply pays subjects a fixed (unconditional) payment: 
the offer of some compensation for effort was enough to induce subjects to think carefully about their beliefs.  
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IV.  Results – Summary Statistics 
A summary of the results from the four experimental sessions is given in Table 1.  This 
summary shows rough trends in the data.  In the next section (V), we control for demographic and 
other subject characteristics in the analysis. 
 
Responders 
We begin by examining the behavior of Responders.  Hispanic Responders have higher 
minimum acceptable offers, on average, than Navajo Responders in all sessions (significant at 2%-
11% level, depending on the session, under Mann-Whitney and t-tests).  In the All-Navajo and All-
Hispanic sessions, 60% of both ethnicities were willing to accept an offer of 10% of the pie ($1).  
These acceptance rates are substantially higher than those observed in previous Ultimatum Game 
experiments in industrialized nations.  Güth et al. (2003) report that anything over 33% is much 
higher than the rates typically observed in Ultimatum Game experiments that use the strategy 
method (including experiments in which subjects played both roles).
10 
Furthermore, both Hispanics and Navajos appear to discriminate against the other group -- 
there is an increase in the minimum offer that they would accept as the relative proportion of their 
ethnic group in the session decreases.  This increase is particularly notable for the Hispanics.
11  The 
                                                           
10 Our anomalous results are not likely to be a result of having players play both roles.  Conducting the same 
experiment at Georgia State University, we find only one-third willing to accept $1 or $2 (mean reservation price 
was $2.77).   The mean offer in this session was $4.17.  This session of 30 subjects had no culture in a majority or 
substantial minority:  14 foreign subjects from 10 different nations, 5 Hispanic, 3 African-American, and 8 White.  
Although we limit our comparisons to other Ultimatum Game experiments that use the strategy method, a recent 
working paper by Oxoby and McLeish (2004) finds no difference in behavior between Proposer and Responder 
behavior when strategies are elicited through the strategy method or simply observed sequentially in the game. 
11 Results from a Jonckheere-Terpstra test (with exact p-values) indicate a significant difference in Hispanic 
Responder behavior across sessions (p=0.0015).  No such significant difference is found among Navajo Responders 
(p=0.2837).  The JT test is a nonparametric test for ordered differences (trend) among classes and is preferable in 
this context to tests of more general class differences (e.g., Kruskal-Wallis H test; Hollander and Wolfe, 1998). 
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same pattern appears in the percent of subjects willing to accept an offer of one dollar.  Both 
Hispanics and Navajo become more willing to accept the one-dollar offer as the proportion of their 
ethnic group in the session increases.  Again, the behavior on the part of Hispanics is more striking.  
Thus Navajo are willing to accept low offers at much higher rates than most other subjects in 
previous Ultimatum Game experiments, whereas Hispanic acceptance rates are only unusually high 
when playing in an All-Hispanic group. 
 
Table 1 
General Summary of Experiment Results 
                                                           .................... Responder....................      ........Proposer........ 
                                                                 Average                % responders                
                                                           reservation price:       accepting $1.00          Average offer: 
                   Session                           Navajo   Hispanic     Navajo   Hispanic     Navajo   Hispanic 
  All subjects same ethnicity    $1.31      $1.83            62%       60%          $3.83      $4.90 
  Subject’s ethnicity is a majority  $1.78      $2.73            61%       33%          $5.13      $4.77 
  Subject’s ethnicity is a minority  $2.00      $3.38            50%       13%          $4.17
12    $4.50 
 
Proposers 
Offers by both Hispanic and Navajo Proposers are in the range observed in earlier studies 
regardless of their proportion of the session: between 38% and about 50% of the $10.00 to be 
divided.  When playing with members of one’s own ethnic group, however, Navajos make 
significantly lower offers than Hispanics (significant at 1% level under both a Mann-Whitney and t-
test).  In addition, Hispanics appear to persistently discriminate against the Navajo -- Hispanic offers 
appear to decline as their majority status diminishes – while Navajos appear to make higher offers 
                                                           
12 The mean offer increases from $4.17 to $5 if one influential subject is removed.  We will discuss this influential 
observation (subject #33) in the next section. 
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when Hispanics are in the session.
13 
 
Statistical versus Preference-based Discrimination 
Any observed changes in Responder behavior as a result of changes in the ethnic mix of the 
session must necessarily reflect preference-based discrimination.  There is no role for statistical 
discrimination on the part of Responders – they simply must accept or reject a given offer.  
As Proposers, however, subjects may make offers that are rational responses to the average 
behavior of subjects from the two ethnic groups (i.e., statistical discrimination).  Navajo Responders 
are, on average, more likely to accept low offers and thus a rational agent without complete 
information may choose an offer based on the likely ethnicity of the Responder.  To examine this 
conjecture, data on subject beliefs are presented in Table 2.  The table, broken down by the ethnic 
mix, presents subjects’ mean predictions of the percentage of individuals in the session that would 
accept low offers ($0-$3).  For example, Hispanic subjects in the All-Hispanic session believed, on 
average, that 35% of the subjects in the session would accept $1; when Hispanic subjects were a 
minority, however, they believed that only 5% of the subjects in the session would accept $1. 
An examination of Hispanic beliefs does not support the statistical discrimination conjecture: 
as the proportion of Navajos in the session increases, Hispanic subjects believe the likelihood of a 
low offer being accepted decreases, yet they send lower offers.
14  The data on Navajo beliefs are 
roughly consistent with the data in Table 1:  there appears to be a decrease in expected acceptance 
rates when Hispanics are present, which would lead to higher offers, but this decrease in average 
                                                           
13 Results from a Jonckheere-Terpstra test (with exact p-values) indicate significant differences in Proposer behavior 
across sessions for both the Navajos (p=0.0237) and Hispanics (p=0.0590). 
14 Results from a Jonckheere-Terpstra test indicate a significant difference in Hispanic beliefs across sessions at the 
1% level for offers of $0 - $3, as well as for the sum of predicted acceptance rates from $0 to $3.  
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expectations is only weakly statistically significant (p<0.10).
15  In summary, there is no evidence of 
statistical discrimination playing a role in the behavior of Hispanic Proposers, and there is weak 
evidence that such discrimination may play a role in the behavior of Navajo Proposers. 
 
Table 2 
Summary of Subject Expectations 
Mean Expected Percentage of Subjects Who Would Accept an Offer of $X 
                                                           ........... Hispanic…….....           ......…….Navajo…....... 
                   Session                           $0   $1  $2    $3    $0     $1    $2      $3 
  All subjects same ethnicity            20%  35%  40%  53%  |    13%    32%    43%    52% 
  Subject’s ethnicity is a majority      7%  27%  33%  41%  |    19%    25%    30%    37% 
  Subject’s ethnicity is a minority      1%    5%    9%  20%  |    12%    27%    29%    37% 
 
 
V.  Results – Regression Analyses 
The summary statistics in the previous section do not, of course, control for demographic 
variability among subjects or the differences in ethnic proportions across sessions.  There was a high 
degree of variability in our subject pool with, for example, ages ranging from 16 to 50 years old and 
annual incomes ranging from less than $5,000 to more than $50,000.  Such variability affected the 
demographic composition across sessions.  For example, among Hispanic subjects in the All-
Hispanic session, the mean age was 32.3 years, 40% of the subjects were male and 40% reported 
incomes less than $5000 per year.  For Hispanic subjects in the Majority-Navajo session, the mean 
age was 22.1 years, 25% of the subjects were male and 12.5% reported incomes less than $5000 per 
year.  Similar variability existed among Navajos across sessions.  Some studies have found that 
socio-demographic attributes are important determinants of behavior in the Ultimatum Game 
                                                           
15 Results from a Jonckheere-Terpstra test indicate weakly significant differences in Navajo beliefs across sessions 
($0: p=0.1383; $1: p=0.2242; $2: p=0.0480; $3: p=0.0311; sum of predictions $0 to $3: p=0.0917).  
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(Harbaugh et al., 2002; Botelho et al., 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001; Stanley and 
Tran, 1998; Carter and Irons, 1991; Kahneman et al. 1986).
16  To control for their effects, and to 
allow us to focus on cross-cultural and inter-cultural aspects of behavior, we conduct regression 
analyses of Proposers’ offers and Responders’ minimum acceptable offers (reservation prices) 
against the variables listed in Table 3. 
Hispanic ethnicity is the omitted ethnicity variable in the models.  Inter-ethnic effects are 
measured by the variables (2) and (3).  The squared interaction term (3.a) between Navajo and 
percent of subjects in a session from a different ethnic group is included as a result of our finding a 
non-linear relationship between Navajo Proposer behavior and the ethnic composition of the 
session.
17  As we will note, however, this non-linearity is largely a result of the behavior of two 
subjects.  Such non-linearity was not observed among Hispanics. 
We estimate two models for each role in the Ultimatum Game:  Model 1, which includes 
demographic variables, and Model 2, which includes demographic and behavioral variables (i.e., 
responses from questions in Figures 2 and 4).
18  Our impression is that some experimental 
economists question the usefulness of asking subjects what they believe and why they made a 
particular decision.   By presenting two models, we demonstrate that our conclusions are not affected 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
16 Although previous Ultimatum Game studies have not included marital status (probably because most of the 
subjects were young college students), 15% of our subject pool was married and we hypothesized that married 
subjects may behave differently in a bargaining situation 
17 We detected this non-linearity using Mallows (1986) augmented component-plus-residuals plot, a sensitive test of 
non-linearity. 
18 We recognize that the responses to some of the behavioral questions may be ambiguous (e.g., a subject may 
consider a 50:50 split “fair” as a Responder but a 70:30 split “fair” as a Proposer), but we believe they are reasonable 
proxies for the behavioral variables that previous studies have suggested are important in the Ultimatum Game 
(Thaler, 1988; Güth and Tietz, 1990; Güth et al., 1996; Güth and van Damme, 1998).  We attempt to control for 
beliefs directly in the regression and thus assume that the variable Reject captures a subject’s concern about 
rejection (e.g., two subjects may both believe a $1 offer has a 50:50 chance of being rejected, but one subject may 
not be concerned about rejection, while the other subject may be). 
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by the inclusion of self-reported behavioral variables. 
 
Table 3.  Variables Used In Regression Analyses 
    Variable          Description                                                               
Dependent variables: 
    RESERV    Responder’s  reservation  price      
    OFFER    Proposer’s  offer       
 
Independent variables: 
1.   Navajo      Dummy variable = 1 if subject is Navajo     
2.   PercentOther    Percent of subjects in session from an ethnic group 
     different that of the subject’s  [0, 96.9]   
3.   NavPercentOther    Interaction between (1) and (2)       
3.a (NavPercentOther)
2   (3) squared, used only in Offer equation 
4.      Age   Subject’s  age        
5.   Male      Dummy variable = 1 if subject is male     
6.   Econ      Number of economics courses taken by subject   
7.   Less$15000    Dummy variable = 1 if subject’s income is less 
 than  $15,000    
8.   $15_$45000    Dummy variable = 1 if subject’s income is 
  between $15,000 and $45,000 
9.   NavLess$15000    Interaction term between (1) and (7) 
10. Nav$15-$45    Interaction term between (1) and (8) 
11. Married      Dummy variable = 1 if subject is married 
12. Fair { * }      Dummy variable = 1 if subject ranks concern for 
  fairness (Figure 4) at 4 or 5 as a {*} = {Responder} 
 or  {Proposer}   
13. Payoff { * }    Dummy variable = 1 if subject ranks concern for 
  earning money at 4 or 5 as a {*} = {Responder} or  
 {Proposer} 
14. Reject      Dummy variable = 1 if Proposer ranks concern  
  about Responder’s rejection at 4 or 5 
15. Known      Dummy variable = 1 if Proposer ranks concern  
          about knowing the Responder at 4 or 5 
  16. Prob$0-3      The sum of subject’s estimates of the percent of  
          subjects who would accept $0, $1, $2, and $3 
  17. Nonmonotonic    Dummy variable = 1 if Responder had non-   
     monotonic  behavior  (see  text).   
 
In the model of Proposer behavior, variable 16 (Prob$0-3) captures a subject’s beliefs about  
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the likelihood that low offers would be accepted:  this variable sums a subject’s estimates of 
acceptance rates [0-100%] for each dollar amount from $0 through $3.  Finally, about 10% of the 
sample had what we term “non-monotonic” Responder preferences:  after choosing to accept an 
offer, the subject chose to reject one or more offers that were higher.  This pattern, which has also 
been found in other studies (e.g., Andreoni et al. 2003), could be due to error, an aversion to unequal 
outcomes (regardless of who benefits) or some other unknown reason.  We include a dummy 
variable (17) for these subjects, but note our results do not change by dropping these subjects or 
pooling them without the dummy variable. 
Given evidence of heteroskedasticity, we use the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of 
variance (White, 1980), which produces robust estimates of the standard errors.
19  In order to address 
the potential correlation between subject beliefs and the error term, we perform an instrumental 
variables regression.  We instrument for Prob$0-3 using the sum of absolute values of the 
differences between a player’s estimated percent of subjects that would accept each potential offer 
and the actual percent of subjects that accepted each offer (i.e., a measure of the overall accuracy of 
a subject’s beliefs).  This sum is highly correlated with Prob$0-3, but uncorrelated with OFFER.
20 
Results from the regressions of Responder behavior (RESERV) and Proposer behavior 
(OFFER) are presented in Tables 4 and 5.  These results will serve as a basis for responses to three 
questions: are findings of substantial cross-cultural differences in bargaining behavior limited to 
cultures in small, non-industrialized societies; can changes in the proportional representation of an 
                                                           
19 We also used Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1993) more conservative HC3 estimator without a substantial change 
in the standard errors.  All regressions were run in Stata v.7. 
 
20  Pearson correlation coefficients are –0.45 (p<0.0001) and 0.05 (p=0.606), respectively.  Running the regressions 
with the OLS estimator does not change our inferences about the ethnicity variables, but does change the estimate 
and standard error of the coefficient on Prob$0-$3.  
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ethnic group substantially affect behavior in the Ultimatum Game; and if discrimination is observed, 
what are the likely causes?  We answer these questions by first examining the behavior of 
Responders, and then focusing on the behavior of Proposers. 
 
Responders 
With respect to cross-cultural effects, Navajos have significantly lower reservation 
prices, on average, than Hispanics in both models (Table 4).  For example, the ethnicity 
coefficients in Model 2 suggest that, depending on income, a Navajo subject will accept, on 
average, between $0.50 and $3.00 less than a Hispanic subject ($0.35 - $2.80 less in Model 1).
With respect to our second question concerning inter-cultural effects, the behaviors of 
both Hispanic and Navajo Proposers are significantly affected by the ethnic composition of the 
session in both models.  Both Hispanics and Navajo discriminate against the other ethnic group 
in the sense that their mean reservation prices increase with an increase in the proportion of 
subjects from the other ethnic group; this effect is most pronounced with Hispanic subjects.  If, 
for example, the subject pool were 25% Hispanic and 75% Navajo, Model 2 predicts that the 
average minimum acceptable offer of Hispanics would be about $1.34 more than if the pool were 
100% Hispanic ($1.44 more in Model 1). 
The coefficient estimates on the ethnicity variables are largely unaffected by including 
subjects’ self-revealed concerns about fairness (Fair) and self-interest (Payoff).
21  The coefficient 
on “Fair” is positive and significant at the 1% level (on average, subjects very concerned about 
fairness had higher minimum acceptable offers).  This result provides support to previous claims 
that concerns about fairness are important factors in explaining the behavior of the average 
                                                           
21  We acknowledge that what a subject considers “fair” may be related to the ethnic mix of the session as well as the  
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Responder in the Ultimatum Game:  a subject who self-reported being concerned about a fair 
division of the pie demanded almost $1 more, on average, than a subject who was not equally as 
concerned. 
 
Table 4.  Responder’s Reservation Price As Dependent Variable 
 
Model 1:  F(11,105)   = 10.27 (Prob>F=0.000)
22;  R-squared = 0.24; Root MSE = 1.50 
Model 2:  F(14,102)   =  7.48  (Prob>F=0.000);  R-squared = 0.32; Root MSE = 1.44 
 
                    Model 1                   Model 2 
                          Coefficient      t-statistic      Coefficient    t-statistic 
Independent Variable     (Standard Error)   (p-value)   (Standard Error)   (p-value) 
Constant                    4.165                  5.20             3.39         3.87    
             (0.801)             (0.000)         (0.875)     (0.000)  
Navajo            -2.793       -4.35          -3.04       -4.17 
             (0.642)     (0.000)             (0.730)     (0.000) 
PercentOther           0.019        2.88           0.018          2.61 
            (0.007)     (0.005)             (0.007)      (0.010) 
NavPercentOther         -0.010       -0.77          -0.009      -0.66 
            (0.013)     (0.443)        (0.014)      (0.510) 
Age             0.011        0.64           0.014         0.82 
            (0.017)     (0.527)        (0.017)      (0.415) 
Male            -0.446       -1.53         -0.421      -1.48 
            (0.292)     (0.130)        (0.283)      (0.141) 
Econ            -0.079       -2.31           -0.060      -1.94 
            (0.032)     (0.023)        (0.031)      (0.056) 
Married           -0.969                  -2.52         -0.970      -2.46 
            (0.385)     (0.013)         (0.394)      (0.016) 
Less$15,000          -2.355       -4.63         -2.057     -3.39 
            (0.509)     (0.000)        (0.607)      (0.001) 
$15-$45,000          -1.793       -3.94         -1.568      -2.86 
            (0.456)      (0.000)        (0.548)      (0.005) 
NavLess$15,000                  2.445        3.20          2.564        3.08 
            (1.027)      (0.002)              (0.831)      (0.003) 
Nav$15-$45,000           1.970        2.35           2.092        2.22 
            (0.838)       (0.021)        (0.942)      (0.029) 
Nonmonotonic                  -0.525       -1.30 
                    (0.403)       (0.196) 
Fair {reserv}                                         0.928        3.25 
                       (0.403)      (0.002) 
Payoff {reserv}                                     -0.021       -0.06 
                    (0.316)       (0.948) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
subject’s personality, but we do not control for this potential endogeneity. 
22 Values of “0.000” imply a value less than 0.001.  
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Table 5.  Proposer’s Offer As Dependent Variable 
 
Model 1:  F(12,104) = 1.97 (Prob>F=0.034);  R-squared = 0.15; Root MSE = 1.56 
Model 2:  F(18,98)   = 2.53 (Prob>F=0.002);  R-squared = 0.20; Root MSE = 1.57 
 
          Model 1              Model 2 
                          Coefficient      t-statistic      Coefficient    t-statistic 
Independent Variable     (Standard Error)   (p-value)   (Standard Error)   (p-value) 
Constant                    6.642                      7.27               6.596         5.67    
             (0.914)            (0.000)         (1.163)     (0.000)  
Navajo            -2.502       -2.17          -2.671      -2.66 
             (1.151)     (0.032)             (1.005)     (0.009) 
PercentOther          -0.013       -1.98          -0.017      -3.28 
            (0.007)     (0.050)             (0.005)      (0.001) 
NavPercentOther                 0.107        3.18           0.087       2.74 
            (0.034)     (0.002)             (0.031)      (0.007) 
NavPercentOther
2        -0.001       -2.75          -0.0008      -1.99 
            (0.000)     (0.007)             (0.0004)      (0.049) 
Age            -0.029       -1.54         -0.019        -1.06 
            (0.019)     (0.126)             (0.018)      (0.292) 
Male             0.092        0.29          0.548      1.44 
            (0.314)     (0.771)             (0.380)      (0.153) 
Econ             0.052        1.62                 0.039      1.40 
            (0.032)     (0.109)             (0.027)      (0.164) 
Married                 -0.245                    -0.55          0.104      0.24 
            (0.442)     (0.580)             (0.435)      (0.812) 
Less$15,000         -1.060       -2.26         -0.472     -0.70 
            (0.470)     (0.026)             (0.675)      (0.486) 
$15-$45,000          -0.689       -1.46         -0.427      -0.68 
            (0.472)      (0.147)                     (0.675)      (0.495) 
NavLess$15,000                  1.232        1.20           1.318      1.46 
            (1.027)      (0.233)              (0.904)      (0.148) 
Nav$15-$45,000                  1.050        0.90           1.440      1.35 
            (1.170)       (0.372)        (1.068)      (0.181) 
Nonmonotonic                  -0.340     -0.76 
                    (0.446)       (0.448) 
Fair {offer}                                            -0.350     -1.05 
                       (0.334)      (0.297) 
Payoff {offer}                                        -0.791     -2.00 
                    (0.371)       (0.048) 
Reject                           0.631      1.70 
                    (0.371)       (0.092) 
Known                   -0.302     -0.52 
                  (0.576)       (0.602) 
Prob$0-3                 -0.006     -2.24 
                  (0.003)       (0.027) 
 
With regard to the demographic variables, we observe that Hispanic reservation prices are 
significantly and positively related to income, whereas such a relationship was not observed for the  
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Navajo (if anything, poorer Navajos demand a little more of the pie).  Married subjects, both 
Hispanic and Navajo, have significantly lower reservation prices than single subjects by almost $1 
on average.  Evidence of gender effects on a Responder’s reservation price is weak, at best, with 
males requiring about $0.45 less than females on average.  A negative, but weakly significant, effect 
also derives from exposure to economics courses.
23 
 
Proposers 
In terms of cross-cultural effects among Proposers, we find a significant difference in the 
behavior of our two cultural groups in both models (Table 5).  On average, Navajos offer less than 
Hispanics.  For example, the ethnicity coefficients in Model 2 suggest that, depending on income 
levels, a Navajo subject offers, on average, between $1.35 and $2.67 less than a Hispanic subject 
($1.27 - $2.50 less in Model 1). Thus our observations of Proposer and Responder behavior imply 
that even among cultures that co-exist in a Western, industrialized society, there may be much 
greater cross-cultural behavioral variability than previous research suggests. 
In terms of our inter-cultural question -- does the ethnic mix of the session “matter” -- we 
find the ethnic composition of the session has significant effects on offers.  Hispanics make the 
highest offers to a Responder when all subjects are Hispanic, and persistently lower offers as the 
percent of Hispanics in the group decreases.  For example, a Hispanic subject offers, on average, 
$1.27 less if Hispanics make up only 25% of the session rather than 100% ($1 less in Model 1). 
                                                           
23 Removing the subject who reported taking 26 courses decreases the coefficient (0.02) and p-value (0.79). 
Turning to Navajo Proposers, the non-linear response to ethnic composition that was   
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evident in Table 1 is also reflected in our regression results:  mean Navajo offers rise and then fall 
their proportional representation of the session decreases (reflected in the significantly positive sum 
of “PercentOther” and “NavPercentOther” and the significantly negative sign on 
“NavPercentOther
2").  However, much of this non-linearity is driven by two influential observations. 
 Using Cook’s (1997) distance to identify influential observations, we identified two Navajo subjects 
who offered $0 as the two most influential observations in Model 2 (#29 in the All-Navajo session; 
#33 in the Majority-Hispanic session).  Removing these observations from the data set removes the 
observed nonlinearity in the data:  the coefficient on NavPercentOther
2 is statistically no different 
from zero (p=0.220).  Removing the two influential observations and the squared variable from the 
regression yields the following coefficients:  PercentOther = -0.019 (p<0.001) and NavPercentOther 
= 0.036 (p=0.001).  This result implies that Hispanic offers decrease linearly in the proportion of  
Navajo subjects in the session (almost 2 cents for every 1% increase in the proportion of Navajos), 
while Navajo offers increase linearly in the proportion of Hispanic subjects in the session (almost 2 
cents for every 1% increase in the proportion of Hispanics). 
 
Predicted Proposer and Responder Behavior 
In an effort to make clear the nature of these cross-cultural and inter-cultural effects, an 
example is given below in Table 6 where we consider two hypothetical subjects: a Navajo and a 
Hispanic subject, both 25 year-old single females with incomes in the $15,000-$45,000 range 
(Fair{reserve}= 0, Fair{offer}= 0, Reject = 0, Known = 0, Payoff{reserve} =1, Payoff{offer}= 1).  
Both subjects have monotonic Responder preferences and have average expectations of low offers 
being accepted.  For various ethnic mixes, Table 6 gives the Responder reservation prices and  
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Proposer offers that are predicted by the regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4 (Model 2).  Because 
the non-linearity observed in Model 2 for Proposer Offers was driven by two influential 
observations, we drop these two observations and use a re-estimated Offer model without the 
squared term “NavPercentOther
2.” 
 
Table 6.  Comparison of Hypothetical Navajo and Hispanic Subjects with Identical Attributes 
 
   Navajo Hispanic 
Percent of 
“other” ethnic 
group in session 
Minimum 
Acceptable Offer 
Offer Minimum 
Acceptable Offer
Offer 
0%  $1.19   $3.13   $2.14   $4.33  
20%  $1.37   $3.46   $2.50   $3.95  
50%  $1.63   $3.96   $3.03   $3.38  
80%  $1.89   $4.45   $3.57   $2.81  
 
In the ethnically homogeneous sessions, reservation prices and offers are substantially 
different between the Navajo and Hispanic “subjects.”  Most importantly for our purpose, as the 
percent of Navajo subjects in a session increases, reservation prices increase and offers decrease for 
the Hispanic subject.  For the Navajo subject, increases in the percent of Hispanics in the session 
also results in increasing reservation prices; her offer, however, also increases as the percent of 
Hispanic subjects in a session increases. 
 
Statistical versus Preference-based Discrimination 
The behavior of Hispanic and Navajo Proposers could be explained as statistical 
discrimination because Navajos are generally more likely to accept low offers in mixed sessions.  
The negative and significant coefficient Prob$0-$3 (beliefs that low offers will be accepted) is, in  
  26
fact, consistent with statistical discrimination.  For example, a Proposer who believes low offers are 
unlikely to be accepted –  only 5% of Responders will accept $0, 10% will accept $1, 20% will 
accept $2 and 30% will accept $3 - will offer $0.39 less than a person who believes the acceptance 
rate is double that. 
If preference-based discrimination were absent among Hispanics, however, controlling for 
beliefs in Model 2 should render the coefficient on PercentOther statistically indistinguishable from 
zero (i.e., once beliefs are accounted for, varying the ethnic mix of the session should not affect the 
offer level).  The coefficient on PercentOther, however, does not move toward zero when we control 
for beliefs and other behavioral variables in Model 2; in fact, it becomes more negative.  This change 
implies that the observed discrimination against Navajos by Hispanics becomes stronger when 
beliefs are incorporated into the model.  This result is consistent with a Hispanic taste for 
discrimination against Navajos.
24  Note that although the term “taste for discrimination” has negative 
connotations, it does not necessarily denote “dislike”; preference-based discrimination could arise, 
for example, from an agent’s belief that a partner with given characteristics does not “need” or 
“deserve” the money as much as another agent with different characteristics (e.g., some Hispanics 
may believe that Navajos receive a substantial amount of state and federal funds and thus do not 
“deserve” a large offer).
25 
Turning to the behavior of Navajo Proposers, the combined sum of PercentOther and 
NavPercentOther (which reflects the mean response of Navajo Proposers to changes in the 
                                                           
24 An alternative, but less plausible, explanation is that Hispanic subjects in the sessions with Navajos were less risk-
averse than Hispanic subjects in the All-Hispanic session and that our demographic and behavioral variables (e.g., 
Reject) do not fully control for these differences in risk aversion. 
25  If Hispanics were to behave in the same manner towards an anonymous partner of unknown ethnicity, one might 
say that Hispanics do not discriminate against Navajos, but rather in favor of Hispanics (Fershtman et al., 2002).  
Exploring this distinction is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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proportion of Hispanics) does move closer to zero but is still positive and substantial.  This result 
provides evidence against the hypothesis that Navajo discrimination against Navajos is entirely a 
result of statistical discrimination.  Removing the two influential Navajo observations (see above) 
and the squared interaction term does not change this conclusion (PercentOther = -0.019 (p<0.001) 
and NavPercentOther = 0.036 (p=0.001)).
26 
A reader may find strange the conclusion that Navajos discriminate against Hispanics when 
they are Responders but against Navajos when they are Proposers.  Previous Ultimatum Game 
analyses, however, suggest that the framing of the Responder’s decision is different from the 
framing of the Proposer’s decision, and thus the operative decision variables are different.  In the 
former decision, issues associated with justice, fairness and equity are operative, but in the latter 
decision, strategic concerns and other-regarding preferences are operative.  We do not pretend to 
understand why these observed patterns of preference-based discrimination take place, but we note 
that the results are consistent across alternative model specifications. 
 
Demographic and Behavioral Variables in Proposer Models 
With regard to the demographic and behavioral variables, there is no strong evidence that a 
subject’s age, marital status, gender, income or experience with economics has a significant effect on 
Proposers’ offers.  Likewise, the fact that a subject had non-monotonic preferences as a Responder, 
was concerned about potentially knowing the Responder with whom he or she would be paired, or 
was concerned about a fair division of the pie has no significant effect on the offer. 
Subjects who reported being concerned about potential rejection of their offer sent, on 
                                                           
26 As with the Hispanic Proposer result, an alternative explanation is that Navajo subjects in the sessions with 
Hispanics were more risk-averse than Navajo subjects in the All-Navajo session and the variables in the regression  
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average, $0.63 more to the Responder (holding constant their beliefs).  Subjects who were concerned 
with keeping as much money as possible sent, on average, $0.79 less.  The signs and statistical 
significance of the coefficients of the behavioral variables thus provide support to previous claims 
that strategic concerns are important in explaining the behavior of the average Proposer in the 
Ultimatum Game, but concerns about fairness are not. 
Although subjects responded strategically to their beliefs, their beliefs were, on average, 
inaccurate; subjects were overly pessimistic about the likelihood of Responders rejecting low offers. 
 To explore the determinants of the accuracy of subject beliefs, we select as the dependent variable 
the sum of absolute values of the differences between a subject’s estimated percent of subjects that 
would accept each potential offer and the actual percent of subjects that accepted each offer.  We 
regress this measure of accuracy on demographic variables (1-11 & 17).  We find some evidence 
that Hispanic beliefs, on average, become less accurate as the percentage of Navajo subjects 
increases in the session and that Navajo beliefs, on average, become more accurate as the percentage 
of Hispanic subjects increases (PercentOther = 1.46, p= 0.069; NavPercent Other = -2.39, p=0.029). 
 Thus Hispanics are most accurate when surrounded by other Hispanics, and Navajos are least 
accurate when surrounded by other Navajos.  We also observe that subjects who are older or had 
non-monotonic preferences as Responders were, on average, less accurate in their beliefs (p<0.05). 
 
 
VI.  Simulated Societies 
Subjects in the experiment described above were only matched once at random.  What if 
these subjects in each session were matched repeatedly, as they would be in a larger society?  How 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
do not fully capture these differences in risk aversion.  
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would members of the Navajo and Hispanic cultures fare in such simulated societies?  To explore 
this question, we take the subjects in each session and create thirty thousand random matches (we 
are implicitly assuming no learning or updating of prior beliefs among our subjects).  We are able to 
randomly re-match subjects because we have each Responder’s decision for every dollar offer a 
Proposer can make in this game. 
We present the results from this simulation in Table 7.  For each simulated society, we 
present the average payoff broken down by culture.  For example, the average payoff to Navajos in 
the All-Navajo simulated society was $3.72, while the average Hispanic payoff in the All-Hispanic 
society was $4.95.  We also present the “agreement rate” for the society, which is the percentage of 
interactions that resulted in positive payoffs for the bargainers. 
 
 
Table 7 
Summary of Simulation Results 
                                                            
                                                           Average Payoff                                    
        Society                            All Subjects   Navajo     Hispanic     Agreement Rate 
  All-Navajo      $3.72    $3.72       -----      74%     
  All-Hispanic     $4.79    -----        $4.95     96% 
  Majority-Navajo    $4.69    $4.64      $4.81    94% 
  Majority-Hispanic    $4.14    $4.07      $4.79    83% 
 
Hispanic bargainers in a culturally homogenous society are better able to extract the 
available surplus than the Navajo bargainers in a culturally homogenous society.  The differences 
stem largely from the higher agreement rate among Hispanic bargainers – Hispanic Proposers in the 
All-Hispanic society tend to make higher offers and Responders are willing to accept low offers.  As 
indicated in the last two rows of the table, Navajo bargainers do better in a mixed society with 
Hispanic members, but Hispanic members do best in a culturally homogenous society.  Note that in  
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the mixed societies, however, Navajo bargainers earn lower payoffs than their Hispanic compatriots. 
  Do such simulations offer insights into current day behaviors and outcomes?  Without further 
experimentation to expand the sample and include other cultural groups from New Mexico, we 
cannot say.  Our purpose here is to simply illustrate the way in which our experimental framework 
allows for simulations that can yield additional insights. We do, however, note intriguing anecdotes 
from the real world that are consistent with the data in Table 7 and imply further study might be 
warranted.  For example, the well-known trend of Hispanic self-segregation is generally thought of 
as largely an issue of language preferences.  Our results suggest that Hispanics may also prefer self-
segregation because it yields greater surplus gains in everyday negotiations.  Indeed, among 
Hispanic communities in Chicago, Aaronson (2004) found that Hispanic-owned firms had access to 
more trade credit when working with Hispanic suppliers.  
  On the Navajo side, we note two observations from the field.  First, Navajo reservations 
continue to lose members to off-reservation towns and cities in which Navajos find themselves in the 
minority.  Second, establishing businesses on Navajo reservations is notoriously difficult because of 
intense negotiations that often fail to achieve a mutually agreeable outcome.  A Navajo businessman 
who opened the first national brand restaurant and hotel near a Navajo reservation chose to build 
them just over the reservation’s borders.  He is quoted as saying, “"The number of businesses that 
are formed on Navajo lands is very small compared to other areas.  The same project that would take 
three to four months to complete in Show Low, Ariz., for instance, could take three to four years on 
Navajo land."
27  The President of the Navajo nation acknowledged such difficulties and stated that 
the nation was “working on making it a little bit easier for businesses to get established.”
28 
                                                           
27 http://www.hirediversity.com/news/newsbyid.asp?id=11971 
28 http://www.indiancountry.com/?1061221789  
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VII. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we depart from traditional empirical investigations to provide a framework to 
advance our understanding of the way in which culture affects economic outcomes.  Our results 
clearly demonstrate that culture can matter in explaining variability in economic outcomes, and in 
more ways than previous research has suggested.  Hispanic and Navajo subjects not only behave 
differently in the Ultimatum Game, but they also respond differently to the ethnic composition of the 
session.  Twenty-six years ago, Thomas Schelling (1978: 108) observed that “undoubtedly for some 
behaviors…it is proportions that influence people, not absolute numbers.”  Our results provide 
empirical support for Professor Schelling’s observation. 
For example, assume that an economist was interested in testing for differences in Navajo 
and Hispanic bargaining behavior in the Ultimatum Game and set up sessions that were 50% 
Hispanic and 50% Navajo.  The economist would likely find that Navajos, on average, have 
lower minimum acceptable offers and make higher offers.  In contrast, the economist who used 
sessions of homogenous ethnic groups would find that Hispanic and Navajo subjects have 
similar minimum acceptable offers but Hispanics make higher offers. The economist who used 
sessions of various ethnic compositions, but did not control for the ethnic mix, might find no 
difference between Navajo and Hispanic subjects.  In our analysis, were we to remove the 
variables that control for the ethnic composition of the sessions in our models of Proposer 
behavior (Table 4), the coefficient on the dummy variable for Navajo subjects would be small 
and not significantly different from zero, suggesting no cross-cultural differences.  If individual 
behavior can be affected by cultural diversity, as well as by the subject’s own culture, 
economists may need to reconsider the way in which they control for cultural differences in 
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empirical analyses.
29 
In addition to demonstrating how one can use experiments to explore the effects of cultural 
diversity on economic outcomes, we also demonstrate how one can use data on behavior, beliefs and 
motivations to provide insights into the cause of the observed behavioral variability that is 
conditional on the cultural mix of the experimental session.  Our data are strongly consistent with 
the hypothesis that Navajo and Hispanic Responders exhibit preference-based discrimination by 
demanding less of the pie from members of their own ethnicities.  The data are also strongly 
consistent with the hypothesis that Navajo and Hispanic Proposers exhibit both statistical and 
preference-based discrimination against Navajo Responders by offering them less. 
Our novel experimental approach to studying cross-cultural and inter-cultural effects on 
economic outcomes should be of general interest to economists.  Throughout the world, policies are 
formulated in societies characterized by mixed ethnicity, race and religion, in which there are clear 
majority and minority groups.  Allocating the costs and benefits of public decisions across citizens 
(e.g., setting tax policy, providing public goods) is a crucial policy issue.  The way in which citizens 
value the potential policy outcomes, however, may not only be affected by the cultural group to 
which they belong, but also by the group’s relative size in the society.  Our experimental approach 
complements ongoing empirical and theoretical work on this subject by offering more control over 
confounding effects and clearer insights into causal relationships. 
                                                           
29 In mixed-race Ultimatum Game sessions, Carpenter, Burks and Verhoogen (2002) find that Black warehouse 
workers offer more as Proposers than Black students. The authors infer that Black students and Black workers 
behave differently, but a closer inspection of the racial composition of the sessions shows dramatic differences. In 
the warehouse session, Black subjects are 25% of the session, while Whites are 25%, Hispanics 9% and the rest are 
classified as “Non-white” (Asians, Native Americans, Other).  In the community college session, Blacks are only 
12% of the session, while Whites are 51%, Hispanics 9% and the rest are Non-whites.  
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As with any research endeavor, this study undoubtedly raises more issues than it settles and 
suggests questions that parallel those posed in Henrich’s (2000: 973) conclusions.  From where do 
people get their social norms and expectations?  Why do these norms and expectations seem to vary 
among groups of people and by the extent of inter-group interactions? Do the effects of diversity 
observed in our experiment extend to other mixes of cultures, e.g., White, Black, intra-White 
cultures, North and South, Catholic and Protestant?  Our hope is that our experimental design and 
results will stimulate research designed to address these questions. 
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Figure 1 – Responder Screen  
Figure 2 – Proposer’s Expectations of the Likelihood of Offer Rejection 
  
Figure 3 – Proposer’s Screen 
  
 
Figure 4 – Post-Experiment Questionnaire of Subject Motivations   1
Appendix 
Instructions to Experiment 
 
This is an experiment about decision-making.  You will never be asked to reveal your identity to 
anyone during the course of the experiment.  Your name will never be associated with any of 
your choices.  In order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any 
other participant. 
 
These instructions will first explain to you the choices that you will be making, and how you will 
earn money in this experiment.  The second part of the instructions will explain how you will 
enter your choices on the computer.  If you have any questions about the procedures at any point 
during these instructions or during the experiment itself, raise your hand and someone will come 
to your seat to answer it. 
 
You can write on these instructions if you wish.  Feel free to refer back to them at any time 
during today's experiment. 
 
During the experiment you are not permitted to speak or communicate with the other 
participants.  
 
In the experiment the currency is U.S. Dollars, which you will be paid at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
The Task 
 
In this experiment you will be randomly and anonymously paired with another person in the 
room.  No one will know the identity of the other person in his or her pair.  Your earnings 
depend on the decisions you make and on the decisions of the person with whom you are paired.  
You and the person with whom you are paired will play different roles.  One of you will be the 
“Proposer” and one of you will be the “Responder.” Your role (whether you’ll be a Proposer or a 
Responder) will be determined at the very end of today’s experiments – in other words, you 
won’t know the results of this experiment until all experiments have been completed.  Therefore, 
it is important that you understand both roles (the Proposer and the Responder) to make good 
choices. 
 
Let’s suppose you are the Proposer.   You will be given some number of dollars.  You may send 
any amount of these dollars to the Responder.  If you send dollars to the Responder and if the 
Responder accepts the number that you send, you will keep the remaining dollars for yourself.   
If you send dollars to the Responder and if the Responder rejects the number you send, both you 
and the Responder receive ZERO dollars. 
 
Consider an example.  You are the Proposer and you are given $100.00 (of course, this is a 
fictitious number used just for the example; sorry, we aren’t going to give you $100.00).  Your 
task as the Proposer is to decide on a division of the $100 between the Proposer and the 
Responder by sending some amount of money to the Responder and keeping the rest.  The   2
Proposer can only send whole dollars:  $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, up to $100, but not 
a value like $33.63.   
 
With this $100 available, if you send $3 to the Responder and the Responder accepts this 
number, you would keep $97.  If the Responder rejects this number, you and the Responder will 
receive ZERO dollars. 
 
If you sent $97 to the Responder and the Responder accepts this number, you would keep $3.   If 
the Responder rejects this number, you and the Responder will receive ZERO dollars. 
 
If you are the Responder, your task is to choose whether to accept or reject the dollars sent by 
the Proposer.  If you accept, you will receive the number of dollars the Proposer has sent to you.  
If you reject the number of dollars sent to you by the Proposer, both you and the Proposer 
receive ZERO dollars.   
 
With $100 available, if the Proposer sends you $97 and you accept this number, you receive $97 
and the Proposer keeps $3.  If you reject this number, both you and the Proposer receive ZERO 
dollars.   If the Proposer sends you $3 and you accept this number, you receive $3 and the 
Proposer keeps $97.  If you reject this number, both you and the Proposer receive ZERO dollars. 
 
Are there any questions concerning your task if you are a Proposer or a Responder?  
  
Before being paired with anyone, each of you in the room today will be asked to make decisions 
in the role of a Proposer and in the role of a Responder.  Your actual role – whether you’ll be a 
Proposer or a Responder – will be determined randomly later in the experiment; therefore, 
there’s a 50-50 chance that you’ll be a Proposer or a Responder.  You won’t know your role – 
whether you’ll be a Proposer or Responder – until after your decisions have been made.   
 
After you have been assigned a role as a Proposer or a Responder, you will then be randomly 
paired with another person in the room, and your decision for only the role assigned to you will 
be carried out.  The money you earn depends on the decisions made by you and the other person 
with whom you are paired. 
Warm-up Exercises  
It is important that everyone understand how to calculate earnings of both the Proposer and the 
Responder.  Below we ask you to calculate the earnings for both of these roles using specific 
examples.  After you finish, raise your hand and one of us will come by your desk and check 
your answers.  For the purpose of this exercise, assume that the Proposer has $25 to divide. 
(1)  If you are the Proposer and you send $8 to the Responder and the Responder accepts 
this number, then you get $________ and the Responder gets $________. 
(2)  If you are the Proposer and you send $8 to the Responder and the Responder rejects this 
number, then you get $________ and the Responder gets  $________. 
(3)  If you are the Responder and the Proposer sends $18 to you and you accept this 
number, then you get $________ and the Proposer gets $________. 
(4)  If you are the Responder and the Proposer sends $18 to you and you reject this number, 
then you get $________ and the Proposer gets $________. 
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The Computer Screen 
 
Everyone now look at the picture on the overhead screen here at the front of the room.  As you 
see here, on your computer screen you will see an icon that says DIVIDE.  When we are ready to 
begin this experiment, you will double click on that icon.  DO NOT DOUBLE CLICK ON 
YOUR MACHINE UNTIL WE HAVE FINISHED YOUR INSTRUCTIONS – just watch the 
overhead at this time.   
 
THE RESPONDER’S DECISION SCREEN.  After you double click on the DIVIDE icon, a 
screen will come up with the title RESPONDER’S DECISION SCREEN.  You (all of you) are 
now being asked to make decisions that will affect how much money you earn in the experiment 
if you are assigned the role of the Responder (half of you will be randomly selected to assume 
this role).   
 
For this experiment, the Proposer will be given $10 to divide between the Proposer and 
Responder.  The screen lists every dollar amount between $0 and $10 that a Proposer could send 
to you.  For each of these dollar amounts, you must decide whether you will Accept or Reject 
the amount if it is sent to you by the Proposer.  You choose Accept or Reject by clicking the 
appropriate button (as you can see here on the overhead screen).  If you click on the Accept 
button, you are indicating that if you are a Responder and if a Proposer sends you this amount of 
money, you will accept this amount from the Proposer.  You will then receive the amount you 
accepted and the Proposer will receive the difference between $10 and the amount you have 
accepted.   
 
If you click on the Reject button, you are indicating that if you are a Responder and if a Proposer 
sends you this amount of money, you will reject this amount from the Proposer.  If you reject the 
amount sent by the Proposer, both you and the Proposer receive ZERO dollars.   
 
After you have made your decision for all of the amounts of money that the Proposer could send 
you – you have clicked on either the Accept or Reject button for each amount -- click on the 
SUBMIT button.  DO NOT CLICK THE “SUBMIT” BUTTON UNTIL YOU ARE SURE 
OF ALL OF YOUR DECISIONS.  Once you click the SUBMIT button you can no longer 
change your mind.   Remember: if you are assigned to play the role of Responder, your choices 
on this screen will determine how much money you earn. 
  
THE PROPOSER’S ESTIMATION SCREEN.   After you have completed the Responder’s 
Decision Screen and clicked on the Submit button, a screen will then come up with the title 
PROPOSER’S ESTIMATION SCREEN.  You are now playing the role of a PROPOSER.  As a 
Proposer, you will first estimate how you think Responders in this room will respond to amounts 
of the $10 that you might send them.  You will then make your decision as to the actual amount 
of this $10 you want to send to the Responder. 
 
The Proposer’s Estimation Screen lists every dollar amount that a Proposer could send to the 
Responder.  As a Proposer, you are now being asked to estimate, for each dollar amount, what 
you think is the chance that this dollar amount would be accepted by a Responder who is in this 
room.  For example, look at $0 that a Proposer could send to a Responder.  If you think that   4
there’s a 90% chance of a Responder accepting this amount, you would use your mouse (put the 
arrow on the slider and hold down on the left-hand click button) to move the slider to the right 
until it reads 90% (as I am demonstrating up here on the overhead screen).   If you think the 
chance that a Responder would accept this amount is 70%, move the slider until it reads 70%.  
You must estimate the chance of a Responder accepting each of the numbers given on this 
screen.  
 
Remember that, on the Responder’s Decision Screen, all of you indicated whether you would 
accept or reject each dollar amount that a Proposer could send you.  At the end of the experiment 
we will compare your estimates for the chance of a Responder accepting each possible amount 
with the actual percentage of people that in fact clicked Accept for each amount.  For each dollar 
amount we will calculate the difference (in percentage points) between your estimate and the 
actual percentage for that dollar amount, and then add up these differences across all 11 numbers 
($0 to $10).  The person whose estimates are closest to the actual percentages (i.e., the person 
with the lowest total difference between estimated and actual percentages) will receive a prize of 
$10 (in addition to whatever they earn in the experiment).  
 
After you have made your estimations for all of the amounts given on this screen, click on the 
SUBMIT button.  DO NOT CLICK THE “SUBMIT” BUTTON UNTIL YOU ARE SURE OF 
YOUR DECISION.   Once you click on the Submit button, you can no longer change your mind. 
 
PROPOSER’S DECISION SCREEN.   After you have completed the Proposer’s Estimation 
Screen and clicked on the Submit button, a screen will then come up with the title PROPOSER’S 
DECISION SCREEN.  On this screen you will see, at the top of the screen, the $10 that is 
available to the Proposer to be divided between the Proposer and the Responder.  Below that you 
see a box with the title: “Send to Responder.”  You are now being asked to make a decision that 
will affect how much money you earn in the experiment if you are randomly chosen to play the 
role of Proposer (half of you will be assigned to this role).  You enter the amount you want to 
send to the Responder using the slide bar.  Using your mouse, put the arrow on the slide bar and 
hold down the left-hand click button.  You can then slide the arrow to the amount that you want 
to send to a Responder.  The amount gets larger the more you slide the arrow to the right as I am 
demonstrating here on the overhead screen.  You will see the amount you are sending in the 
“Send to Responder” box.  The number of dollars that you would keep, if the Responder accepts 
what you have sent, is shown directly below the box: “You keep XX dollars.”  This number, the 
number of dollars that you keep, changes automatically when you change the number of dollars 
that you are considering sending to the Responder.  Remember; the number of dollars that you 
keep is the difference between the $10 and the number you are sending to the Responder.  When 
you are certain of the number of dollars that you have entered in the “Send to Responder” box is 
really the number that you want to send to the Responder, click on the SUBMIT button located at 
the bottom of your screen.  DO NOT CLICK THE “SUBMIT” BUTTON UNTIL YOU ARE 
SURE OF YOUR DECISION.  Once you click this button you can no longer change your mind.  
Remember: if you are assigned to play the role of Proposer, your choice on this screen will 
determine how much money you earn. 
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After you click on the Submit button you will see a screen that asks two questions about the 
decisions you made in your role as a Responder and as a Proposer.  You cannot see these 
questions here on the overhead.  You will see them on your screen during the experiment.  When 
you have answered the questions, click on the Submit button.  The computer will then randomly 
assign you to either the role of Proposer or Responder and it will randomly pair you with another 
person in this room.  The decisions you made on the screen for the role assigned to you will be 
carried out, as will the decisions of the person with whom you are paired.  The results, and your 
earnings from this experiment, will be shown to you after all experiments have been completed.   
 
After you have clicked on the Submit button, you will see a screen that says: “Please wait for 
others to make their decisions.”  Please wait quietly until everyone has made their decisions. 